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1 Introduction
This document considers optimal institutional design of biodiversity manage-
ment under lobbying, with a special focus on the following problems. Should
biodiversity management be run by jurisdictions or a central planner? How
much authority should this planner get? Are regulatory powers sufficient, or
should the central planner have a budget to finance conservation subsidies?
The framework for this study is based on the following experience. The
“central planner” called the European Commission (EC) manages biodiver-
sity and two directives regulate nature conservation in the the European
Union (EU) (cf. Ostermann 1998):
• Birds Directive 79/409/EEC on the conservation of wild birds;
• Habitats Directive 92/43/EEC on the conservation of natural habitats
and of wild fauna and flora.
The Habitats Directive calls for the establishment of a network of designated
sites, called Natura 2000, which will consist of sites designated under the
Habitats Directive (Special Areas of Conservation, SACS) and the Birds Di-
rective (Special Protection Areas, SPAS). These directives contain annexes
with habitats and species listed as being of Community interest, and whose
conservation requires the designation of sites by the Member States. A Mem-
ber State is obliged to guarantee a “Favorable Conservation Status”, which is
defined in the Habitats Directive, to a Natura 2000 site with the obligations
of monitoring and reporting.
Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) play a crucial role in the highly
complex political structure of the EU. Weber and Christophersen (2002)
describe the political influence of the forest-owner associations (CEPF and
BNFF) and the environmental NGOs (WWF and Fern) on the process of im-
plementing the EU habitats directive (HD). They highlight the relationship
between the involvement of interest groups in the political process and the
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acceptance of legislation among their members. In this paper, I examine the
political equilibrium in which the interest groups representing the member
countries lobby the Commission over biodiversity management.
There are three reasons why EU policy relies heavily on regulation rather
than on other mechanisms to achieve its objectives (Ledoux et al. 2000).
• Until 1987, EU environmental policy lacked a proper legal basis in
the founding Treaty of Rome. Consequently, all environmental policies
had to rely on the “implied powers” of Article 235 of the Treaty, which
stipulated the use of directives and nothing else.
• With the ratification of the 1999 Amsterdam Treaty, the EU can only
adopt eco-taxes and other fiscal measures with the unanimous agree-
ment of every state (Jordan 1998). This need for unanimity represents
both a huge hurdle to ecological tax reform and a continuing institu-
tional inducement to rely on regulation.
• The founding Member States gave the EU a powerful institutional in-
centive to regulate wherever possible by vesting it with so few financial
resources of its own. From the Commission’s perspective, regulation
has the benefit of being paid for by private actors in the Member States
rather than the EU itself (Majone 1996).
In this study, I consider biodiversity management in three cases:
• There is no such international authority as the Commission.
• The current situation in the EU: regulation by the Commission.
• The Commission gets more authority: it can use subsidies and dis-
tribute the costs of these to the member countries.
The comparison of these cases reveals whether or not the Commission’s
present authority is adequate.
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MacArthur and Wilson (1967) show that the total number of species is
an increasing function of the habitat area. On the assumption that the num-
ber of species yields utility, Swanson (1994), Barbier and Schulz (1997) and
Endres and Radke (1999) consider the optimal area of habitat, comparing
the benefits of its maintenance with the opportunity cost of using land in
production. These models analyze the effects of an external shock (e.g. a
change in trade policy) on biodiversity. Rowthorn and Brown (1999) intro-
duce exogenous technical change into the optimal habitat model, finding that
a country with a high discount rate preserves more land when the elasticity
of substitution between consumption and species exceeds unity.
Without endogenous technical change, the optimal choice of a habitat is
merely that of allocating land between conservation and production. With
endogenous technical change, there may be the following positive link be-
tween biodiversity and economic growth. The protection of biodiversity re-
quires transferring land from production to conservation. If this decreases
output, then employment in production and wages fall. Lower wages en-
courage labor-intensive R&D to expand, thus speeding up technical change
and economic growth. Because this link may play an important role in the
analysis, I introduce in-house R&D into the optimal habitat model.
To consider the political economy of biodiversity management, I introduce
lobbying into the the optimal habitat model. This can be examined either by
the all-pay auction model in which the lobbyist making the greater effort wins
with certainty, or the menu-auction model in which the lobbyists announce
their bids contingent on the politician’s actions. In the all-pay auction model,
lobbying expenditures are incurred by all the lobbyists before the politician
takes an action. In the menu-auction model, it is not possible for a lobbyist
to spend money and effort on lobbying without getting what he lobbied for.
A good example of the all-pay auction is Johal and Ulph’s environmental-
policy model (2002) in which local interest groups lobby to influence the
probability of getting their favorite type of government elected. I however
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opt for the menu-auction model, because that better characterizes the case
in which the central planner’s decision variables lobbied over (e.g., regulatory
constraints, subsidies) are continuous and the interest groups obtain marginal
improvements in their position by lobbying. I assume in this document that
the central planner is self-interested, households love biodiversity, goods are
produced from labor and land and biodiversity is an increasing function of
habitat land in all jurisdictions of the economy.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the structure of
the economy and section 3 the model for a single jurisdiction. Section 4
constructs the Pareto optimum for the economy as a reference case. Sections
5 and 6 examine the two alternatives of biodiversity management: direct
regulation and conservation subsidies.
2 The model
Consider an economy with a large number of jurisdictions which are placed
evenly over the limit [0, 1].1 All jurisdictions produce the same consumption
good at the price p. Each jurisdiction j possesses one unit of labor, of which
the amount lj is devoted to production and the rest zj to R&D, and one unit
of land, of which the amount nj is devoted to production and the rest bj to
conservation:
1 = lj + zj, 1 = nj + bj. (1)
MacArthur andWilson (1967) show empirically that the number of species
expected to survive in an island is proportional to the area of that island. Fol-
lowing Rowthorn and Brown (1999), I assume that in each jurisdiction j, the
area devoted to conservation, bj, functions like an “island” in the MacArthur-
Wilson sense. Thus, biodiversity in the economy, b, can be specified simply
1If the jurisdictions were heterogeneous, then there could be multiple equilibria.
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as the sum of conserved areas in the economy:
b
.
=
∫ 1
0
bkdk. (2)
With perfect markets for goods, labor and land, the agents in jurisdiction
j behave as if they were a single revenue-maximizing agent (hereafter juris-
diction j) possessing all resources in that jurisdiction. Its utility starting at
time T is2 ∫ ∞
T
cjb
δe−ρ(θ−T )dθ, δ > 0, ρ > 0, (3)
where θ is time, ρ the constant rate of time preference, cj its consumption,
b biodiversity, and δ a parameter with the following characterization: the
higher δ, the more the households appreciate biodiversity in the economy, b.
Because there is no money in the model that would pin down the nominal
price level at any time, I can choose the monetary unit so that the consumer
price (1 + τ)p, where p is the producer price and τ is the consumption tax,
is equal to the externality effect bδ in the model:
(1 + τ)p = bδ or p = bδ/(1 + τ). (4)
2.1 Technology
When jurisdiction j develops a new technology, it increases its total factor
productivity (TFP) by the constant a > 1. Its TFP is then equal to aγj ,
where γj is its technology serial number. Given TFP, jurisdiction j is subject
to the CES production function f(lj, nj) with constant returns to scale, where
lj (nj) is the input of labor (land):
yj = a
γjf(lj, nj), fl > 0, fn > 0, fll < 0, fln = −flllj/nj,
fnn = −flnlj/nj = fll(lj/nj)2, (5)
2With the general form of the utility function,
∫∞
T
c1−βj b
δe−ρ(θ−T )dθ, where β ∈ [0, 1)
is a constant, it would be very difficult to find a stationary state in the model.
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where the subscript l denotes the partial derivative with respect to lj (nj).
In this one-good economy, total consumption is equal to total production:∫ 1
0
cjdj =
∫ 1
0
ykdk. (6)
Because the labor market is competitive, the producer real wage (rent)
wj (rj) is determined by the marginal product of labor (land):
wj = ∂yj/∂lj = a
γjfl(lj, nj), rj = ∂yj/∂lj = a
γjfn(lj, nj). (7)
Noting (5) and (7), the expenditure shares of land ξ and labor 1− ξ are
wjlj
yj
=
ljfl(lj, nj)
f(lj, nj)
=
fl(lj/nj, 1)
f(lj/nj, 1)
= 1− ξ
(
lj
nj
)
,
njfn(lj, nj)
f(lj, nj)
.
= ξ
(
lj
nj
)
.
(8)
2.2 Research and development
The improvement of technology in jurisdiction j depends on labor devoted
to R&D in that jurisdiction, zj. In a small period of time dt, the probability
that R&D will lead to development of a new technology with a jump from
γj to γj + 1 is given by λzjdt, while the probability that R&D will remain
without success is given by 1− λzjdt, where the constant λ is productivity
in R&D. Noting (1), this defines a Poisson process χj with
dχj =
{
1 with probability λzjdt,
0 with probability 1− λzjdt, zj = 1− lj, (9)
where dχj is the increment of the process χj. The expected growth rate of
productivity aγj is given by
gj
.
= E
[
log aγj+1 − log aγj] = (log a)λzj = (log a)λ(1− lj), (10)
where E is the expectation operator (cf. Aghion and Howitt 1998, p. 59).
2.3 The central planner
The central planner does not observe the level of productivity, aγj , but ob-
serves the producer real wage wj and the producer rent rj in each jurisdiction
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j. I assume that the only revenue-raising tax is the tax τ on consumption
expenditure p
∫ 1
0
ckdk, where p is the consumption price and ck consumption
in jurisdiction k.3 With a subsidy η to R&D expenditure wjzj and a subsidy
s to expenditure on conserved land, rjbj, the central planner’s budget is
τ
∫ 1
0
ckdk =
∫ 1
0
(ηwjzj + srjbj)dj. (11)
The central planner decides on the minimum proportion of conserved
land, b, for all jurisdictions j:
bj ≥ b ∈ [0, 1] for j ∈ [0, 1]. (12)
When this constraint is binding, the planner exercises direct regulation.
In order to avoid multiple equilibria, I assume that the jurisdictions are
biased for a low tax rate:
Assumption 1 If the jurisdictions face two candidates for the central plan-
ner so that both of these offer the same level of welfare for them but with a
different tax rate τ , then they vote for the one with a lower tax rate τ .
3 Jurisdictions
Jurisdiction j pays political contributionsRj to the central planner. I assume,
for simplicity, that the central planner consists of civil servants, of which a
constant proportion gj ∈ [0, 1] inhabits jurisdiction j. It is then true that∫ 1
0
gkdk = 1. (13)
Thus, each jurisdiction j gets a constant share gj of total contributions
R =
∫ 1
0
Rkdk. (14)
3This corresponds well to the institutions of the EU.
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Without political contributions, jurisdiction j earns output yj and subsi-
dies ηwjzj+srjbj in terms of the consumption good. Given the consumption
tax τ , this income is in terms of consumption equal to (ηwjzj+srjbj)/(1+τ).
Noting (1), (5) and (7), the ratio of this ‘legal’ income relative to productiv-
ity, aγj , is defined as follows:
(yj + ηwjzj + srjbj)/[(1 + τ)a
γj ]
=
[
f(lj, nj) + ηzjfl(lj, nj) + sfn(lj, nj)bj
]
/(1 + τ)
=
[
f(lj, 1− bj) + (1− lj)ηfl(lj, 1− bj) + sfn(lj, 1− bj)bj
]
/(1 + τ)
.
= φ(lj, bj, s, η, τ). (15)
The budget constraint of jurisdiction j is given by
(1 + τ)pcj = p(yj + ηwjzj + srjbj) + gjR−Rj, (16)
where cj is consumption, τ the consumption tax, p the price of the consump-
tion good, yj + ηwjzj + srjbj the ‘legal’ income, Rj the contributions to the
central planner and gjR the proportion of total contributions in jurisdiction
j. Noting (4), (15) and (16), consumption in jurisdiction j is determined by
cj = (yj + ηwjzj + srjbj)/(1 + τ) + (gjR−Rj)/[p(1 + τ)]
= aγjφ(lj, bj, s, η, τ) + (gjR−Rj)b−δ. (17)
Noting (3) and (17), the expected utility of jurisdiction j starting at time
T is given by
Γj = E
∫ ∞
T
cjb
δe−ρ(θ−T )dθ
= E
∫ ∞
T
aγj
bδ
1 + τ
φ(lj, bj, s, η, τ)e
−ρ(θ−T )dθ +
gjR−Rj
ρ
, (18)
where E is the expectation operator. Jurisdiction j maximizes (18) by labor
input lj and conserved land bj subject to technical change (9) and the regula-
tory constraint (12), taking the tax τ , the subsidies (s, η), biodiversity b, and
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the contributions (Rj, R) as given. This maximization and the symmetry
throughout the regions j ∈ [0, 1] imply the results (cf. Appendix A):
(i) lj = l, bj = b and nj = 1− bj = 1− b for j ∈ [0, 1], (19)
(ii) the equilibrium value of the function φ:
φ(l, b, s, η, τ) = f(l, 1− b), (20)
(iii) the first-order condition for conserved land bj:
(1− s)ξ
(
l
1− b
)
=
[
(1− l)η − slb
1− b
]
lfll(l, 1− b)
f(l, 1− b) for b > b, (21)
(iv) the first-order condition for labor input in production, lj:
(1− η)
[
1− ξ
(
l
1− b
)]
+
[
(1− l)η − slb
1− b
]
lfll(l, 1− b)
f(l, 1− b)
=
(a− 1)λl
ρ+ (1− a)λ(1− l) , (22)
(iv) the value function Γj:
Γj(b, γj, s, η, τ, R,Rj), ∂Γj/∂Rj = −1/ρ,
∂Γj
∂b
=
bδ−1Ωj
1 + τ
[
b
1− b
{
(s− 1)ξ
(
l
1− b
)
+
[
(1− l)η − sl
1− b
]
lfll(l, 1− b)
f(l, 1− b)
}
+ δ
]
for b = b,
∂Γj
∂b
=
bδ
1 + τ
δ
Ωj
b
= δ
bδ−1Ωj
1 + τ
for b > b, (23)
where Ωj is the maximum value of E
∫ ∞
T
aγjφe−ρ(θ−T )dθ.
4 The Pareto optimum
Assume a benevolent central planner that claims no political contributions,
Rj = 0 for all j, uses subsidies (s, η) to both R&D and conserved land, and
maximizes the expected value of the geometric average of the utility of the
jurisdictions in the whole economy:
E
∫ ∞
T
cbδe−ρ(θ−T )dθ with log c .=
∫ 1
0
log cjdj. (24)
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Because the planner controls the allocation of resources completely by the
subsidies (s, η), it attains the Pareto optimum (lP , bP ) (cf. Appendix B):[
1− ξ
( lP
1− bP
)][
ρ+ (1− a)λ(1− lP )] = (a− 1)λlP , (25)
bP
1− bP ξ
(
lP
1− bP
)
= δ. (26)
5 Direct regulation
Assume a self-interested central planner that has no budget of its own, s =
η = τ = 0, controls the proportion of conserved land directly by setting
b = b, and maximizes the present value of the expected flow of the political
contributions at time T [cf. (13)],4
E
∫ ∞
T
∫ 1
0
Rje
−ρ(θ−T )dθ =
1
ρ
∫ 1
0
Rjdj. (27)
In line with Grossman and Helpman (1994), I construct a common agency
game as follows. First, the jurisdictions set their political contributions Rj
conditional on the central planner’s prospective policy b, taking total con-
tributions R as given.5 Second, the central planner sets b and collects the
contributions. Third, the jurisdictions maximize their expected utility given
the contributions Rj and R. The game is solved in reverse order: first for a
jurisdiction (stage 3) and then for the political equilibrium (stages 2 and 1).
With direct regulation, labor input lj is the only instrument and (22) the
only equilibrium condition for jurisdiction j. Noting (12), the value function
4This is a modification of the idea of Grossman and Helpman (1994), who assume that
a policy maker’s welfare is a linear function of both the political contributions and the
utilities of the lobbies. This characterizes the fact that the policy maker cares about (a)
its revenue from political contributions and (b) the possibility of being re-elected, which
depends of the utility of the electorate (i.e. the members of the lobbies). I simplify
this setup by ignoring the utilities of the lobbies. Because the policy instruments must
maximize the utility of each lobby in equilibrium [cf. condition (iii) in Appendix C], the
results would not change if I used Grossman and Helpman’s original welfare function.
5The crucial point in the common agency game is that each jurisdiction j can credibly
commit itself to its contribution function Rj(b).
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(23) and the equilibrium condition (22) for jurisdiction j take the form
Γj(b
R, γj, 0, 0, 0, R,Rj), (28)
(a− 1)λlR = [ρ+ (1− a)λ(1− lR)][1− ξ( lR
1− bR
)]
.
(29)
The central planner maximizes the present value (27). Each jurisdic-
tion j maximizes the value of its optimal program, (28), by influencing the
central planner by its contributions Rj, but taking total contributions R as
given. Because bR is a policy and Rj(b
R) the strategy of jurisdiction j, the
equilibrium conditions of this game are [cf. (ii) and (iii) in Appendix C]
b = argmax
bR
1
ρ
∫ 1
0
Rj(b
R)dj, (30)
b = argmax
bR
Γj(b
R, γj, 0, 0, 0, R,Rj(b
R)) for j ∈ [0, 1]. (31)
With (23) and η = s = τ = 0, the condition (31) is equivalent to
0 =
∂Γj
∂b
+
∂Γj
∂Rj
R′j = (b
R)δ−1Ωj
[
− b
R
1− bR ξ
(
lR
1− bR
)
+ δ
]
− 1
ρ
R′j
and
R′j = ρ(b
R)δ−1Ωj
[
δ − b
R
1− bR ξ
(
lR
1− bR
)]
.
(32)
Finally, given (32), the condition (30) is equivalent to
0 =
1
ρ
∫ 1
0
R′jdj =
[
δ − b
R
1− bR ξ
(
lR
1− bR
)]
(bR)δ−1
∫ 1
0
Ωjdj. (33)
This and the equation (29) satisfy the conditions (25) and (26). I conclude:
Proposition 1 Direct regulation is Pareto optimal, (lR, bR) = (lP , bP ).
The central planner, benevolent or self-interested, eliminates the externality
due to biodiversity as a macroeconomic decision-maker.
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6 Conservation subsidies
Assume a self-interested central planner that imposes the conservation sub-
sidy s. Assume furthermore that because the planner cannot fully distinguish
between R&D and other labor expenditures, the R&D subsidy η is incentive
incompatible. Without losing any generality, I can then choose η = 0.
In this common agency game, the subsidy s is public policy instrument.
With η = 0, the value function (23) and the equilibrium conditions (21) and
(22) for jurisdiction j become
Γj(b
S, γj, s, 0, τ, R,Rj), (34)
s
(lS)2bSfll(l
S, 1− bS)
(1− bS)f(lS, 1− bS) = (s− 1)ξ
(
lS
1− bS
)
,
(35)
(a− 1)λlS
ρ+ (1− a)λ(1− lS) = 1− ξ −
s(lS)2fll
(1− bS)f = 1− sξ
(
lS
1− bS
)
.
(36)
In this setup, the budget constraint (11) becomes (cf. Appendix D)
τ =
sbS
1− bS ξ
(
lS
1− bS
)
.
(37)
In the three equations (35), (36) and (37), there are three unknown variables
τ , lS and bS, and one known variable s. This system defines the functions
τ(s), lS(s), bS(s). (38)
Unfortunately, the derivatives of these functions are mathematically ambigu-
ous. For this reason, I make the plausible assumption that the direct effect
of the subsidy s dominates. This implies that the following holds true:
Assumption 2 An increase in the subsidy s to conserved land increases
both the supply of conserved land, (bS)′ > 0, and the tax that is needed for
financing the increase of the subsidy, τ ′ > 0.
The central planner maximizes the present value of the expected flow
of the political contributions at time T , (27). Jurisdiction j maximizes the
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value of its optimal program, (34), by influencing the central planner by
its contributions Rj, but taking total contributions R as given. Because s
is a policy and Rj(s) the strategy of jurisdiction j, then, given (38), the
equilibrium conditions are [cf. (ii) and iii) in Appendix C]:
s = argmax
s
1
ρ
∫ 1
0
Rj(s)dj, (39)
s = argmax
s
Γj
(
b, γj, s, 0, τ(s), R,Rj(s)
)
for j ∈ [0, 1]. (40)
From (5), (8) and (35) it follows that conserved land is subsidized:
s =
[
ξ︸︷︷︸
+
− (l
S)2bSfll
(1− bS)f︸ ︷︷ ︸
−
]−1
ξ︸︷︷︸
+
> 0.
Given (37), this subsidy s > 0 must be financed by the wage tax τ > 0.
To show that (lS, bS) 6= (lP , bP ), assume (lS, bS) = (lP , bP ). In that case,
relations (25), (36) and (38) lead to the following contradiction:
0 = 1− ξ
(
lP
1− bP
)
− (a− 1)λl
P
ρ+ (1− a)λ(1− lP ) =
1− ξ
(
lS
1− bS
)
− (a− 1)λl
S
ρ+ (1− a)λ(1− lS) =
slS
1− bS
lSfll(l
S, 1− bS)
f(lS, 1− bS) 6= 0.
Thus, (lS, bS) 6= (lP , bP ) holds true. This and Proposition 1 imply that:
Proposition 2 The equilibrium with conservation subsidies is Pareto sub-
optimal, (lS, bS) 6= (lP , bP ). Consequently, a switch from regulation to con-
servation subsidies decreases welfare.
Because the equilibrium (lS, bS) is Pareto suboptimal, then the same wel-
fare can be attained by two tax rates τ (with corresponding subsidies s):
• With a higher tax rate τ , the subsidy s is higher and consequently, the
amount of conserved land is bigger than at Pareto optimum, bS > bP .
• With a lower tax rate τ , the subsidy s is lower and consequently, the
amount of conserved land is smaller than at Pareto optimum, bS < bP .
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Given Assumption 1, the highest feasible tax is the tax corresponding to the
Pareto optimum. Thus, only the equilibrium with a lower tax rate, bS < bP ,
is feasible. Given this, Assumption 2 and Proposition 2, I conclude:
Proposition 3 A switch from direct regulation into conservation subsidies
decreases both the growth rate (i.e. gR = gP > gS) and biodiversity in each
jurisdiction (i.e. bR = bP > bS).
Because any inefficiency decreases the resources of the economy, there are
less resources to be put into R&D and the conservation of biodiversity.
7 Conclusions
This paper considers an economy in which the conservation of land yields
utility through biodiversity, firms improve their efficiency by in-house R&D
and local interest groups lobby a self-interested central planner over biodiver-
sity management. I compare two policy alternatives: the regulation of land
use and subsidies for conserved land. The main findings are the following.
In the case of regulation, the central planner determines the use of land
throughout the whole economy, fully internalizing the externality through
biodiversity. With subsidies, revenue-raising taxes cause distortions. For
this reason, a shift from subsidies to direct regulation increases the resources
of the jurisdictions, promoting investment in R&D and economic growth.
The transfer of labor from production to R&D decreases the demand for
land in production. This promotes the conservation of land and biodiversity.
While a great deal of caution should be exercised when a highly stylized
game-theoretical model is used to derive results on growth and biodiversity,
the following conclusion seems to be justified. The prospect of lobbying
changes the outcome of biodiversity management fundamentally. A larger
package of policy instruments leads to Pareto improvement with a benevolent
central planner, but to Pareto worsening with a self-interested one. In the
14
case of Natura 2000, for instance, regulation without any budget may be
an appropriate degree of authority for the Commission. Greater authority
narrows biodiversity and slows down economic growth.
Appendix
A Equations (21) and (22) and function (23)
Noting (5) and (8), the function (15) has the partial derivatives:
∂φ
∂bj
= (s− 1)fn(lj, 1− bj)− (1− lj)ηfln(lj, 1− bj)− sfnn(lj, 1− bj)bj
=
{
(s− 1)ξ
(
lj
1− bj
)
+
[
(1− lj)η − sljbj
1− bj
]
ljfll(lj, 1− bj)
f(lj, 1− bj)
}
× f(lj, 1− bj)
1− bj = 0 for b > b, (41)
∂φ
∂lj
= (1− η)fl(lj, 1− bj) + (1− lj)ηfll(lj, 1− bj) + sfln(lj, 1− bj)bj
= (1− η)
[
1− ξ
(
lj
1− bj
)]
f(lj, 1− bj)
lj
+
[
(1− lj)η − sljbj
1− bj
]
fll(lj, 1− bj). (42)
The maximization of the expected utility (18) by (lj, bj) s.t. (9) and (12),
given (τ, s, η, b, Rj, R), is equivalent to the maximization of
E
∫ ∞
T
aγj
bδ
1 + τ
φ(lj, bj, s, η, τ)e
−ρ(θ−T )dθ
s.t. (9) and (12), given (τ, s, η, b, Rj, R). The value of this optimal program
starting at time T is
Ωj(γj, b, s, η, τ)
.
= max
(lj , bj) s.t. (9),(12)
E
∫ ∞
T
bδ
1 + τ
aγjφ(lj, bj, s, η, τ)e
−ρ(θ−T )dθ.
(43)
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The Bellman equation corresponding to the optimal program (43) is given
by (cf. Dixit and Pindyck 1994)
ρΩj = max
(lj , bj) s.t. (9)
Λj(lj, bj, γj, b, s, η, τ), (44)
where
Λj(lj, bj, γj, b, s, η, τ) =
bδ
1 + τ
aγjφ(lj, bj, s, η, τ) + λ(1− lj)
[
Ωj(γj + 1, b, s, η, τ)− Ωj(γj, b, s, η, τ)
]
.
(45)
The first-order conditions corresponding to the Bellman equation (44)
and (45) are ∂Λj/∂lj = 0 and ∂Λ
j/∂bj = 0. To solve the dynamic program,
I assume that the value of the program, Ωj, is in fixed proportion to the
instantaneous utility at the optimum:
Ωj(γj, b, s, η, τ) = ϕj
bδ
1 + τ
aγjφ(l∗j , bj, s, η, τ) with bj = b
∗
j for bj > b, (46)
where ϕj is a constant and l
∗
j and b
∗
j are the optimal values of lj and bj. From
(46) it follows that
Ωj(γj + 1, b, s, η, τ)/Ωj(γj, b, s, η, τ) = a. (47)
Inserting (46) and (47) into the Bellman equation (44) and (45) yields
1/ϕj = ρ+ (1− a)λ(1− lj) > 0. (48)
Noting (41), (42), (45), (47) and (48), the first-order conditions corre-
sponding to the maximization (44) are given by
1
Ωj
∂Λj
∂bj
=
bδaγj
Ωj
∂φ
∂bj
=
bδaγj
(1 + τ)Ωj
f(lj, 1− bj)
1− bj
{
(s− 1)ξ
(
lj
1− bj
)
+
[
(1− lj)η − slj
1− bj
]
ljfll(lj, 1− bj)
f(lj, 1− bj)
}
= 0 for b > b, (49)
1
Ωj
∂Λj
∂lj
=
bδaγj
(1 + τ)Ωj
∂φ
∂lj
− λ
[
Ωj(γj + 1, b, s, η, τ)
Ωj(γj, b, s, η, τ)
− 1
]
=
1
ϕjφ
∂φ
∂lj
− (a− 1)λ
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=
[
ρ+ (1− a)λ(1− lj)
]1
φ
∂φ
∂lj
− (a− 1)λ
=
[
ρ+ (1− a)λ(1− lj)
]f(lj, 1− bj)
(1 + τ)φ
{
(1− η)
[
1− ξ
(
lj
1− bj
)]
1
lj
+
[
(1− lj)η − sljbj
1− bj
]
fll(lj, 1− bj)
f(lj, 1− bj)
}
− (a− 1)λ = 0. (50)
In the system consisting of the central planner budget (11) and the first-
order conditions (49) and (50) for all jurisdictions j ∈ [0, 1], there is symmetry
throughout j ∈ [0, 1]. This implies lj = l and bj = b for j ∈ [0, 1]. From this,
(1), (5), (6), (13), (14), (15) and (17) it follows that
φ(l, b, s, η, τ) =
∫ 1
0
aγjφ(l, b, s, η, τ)dj
/∫ 1
0
aγkdk
=
[∫ 1
0
aγjφ(l, b, s, η, τ)dj + b−δ
∫ 1
0
(gjR−Rj)dj︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0
]/∫ 1
0
aγkdk
=
∫ 1
0
[
aγjφ(l, b, s, η, τ) + (gjR−Rj)b−δ
]
dj
/∫ 1
0
aγkdk
=
∫ 1
0
cjdj
/∫ 1
0
aγkdk =
∫ 1
0
yjdj
/∫ 1
0
aγkdk = f(l, 1− b).
(51)
This implies (20). Inserting (51), lj = l and bj = b back to (49) and (50)
yields (21) and (22).
Noting lj = l, bj = b, (15), (43), (46) and (51), the expected utility of
jurisdiction j, (18), can be written as follows:
Γj(b, γj, b, s, η, τ, R,Rj)
.
= Ωj(γj, b, s, η, τ) + (gjR−Rj)/ρ, ∂Γj
∂Rj
= −1
ρ
,
∂Γj
∂b
∣∣∣∣
b=b
=
bδ
1 + τ
[
∂Ωj
∂bj
+ δ
Ωj
b
]
=
bδ
1 + τ
[
Ωj
φ
∂φ
∂bj
+ δ
Ωj
b
]
=
bδ
1 + τ
{
Ωj
φ
[
(s− 1)fn − (1− lj)ηfln − sfnn
]
+ δ
Ωj
b
}
=
bδΩj
1 + τ
[
1
φ
{
(s− 1)f(lj, 1− bj)
1− bj ξ +
[
(1− l)η − sl
1− b
]
lfll
1− b
}
+
δ
b
]
17
=
bδΩj
1 + τ
[
f(l, 1− b)
(1− b)φ(l, b, s, η, τ)
{
(s− 1)ξ +
[
(1− l)η − slb
1− b
]
lfll
f
}
+
δ
b
]
=
bδ−1Ωj
1 + τ
[
b
1− b
{
(s− 1)ξ
(
l
1− b
)
+
[
(1− l)η − slb
1− b
]
lfll(l, 1− b)
f(l, 1− b)
}
+ δ
]
,
∂Γj
∂b
=
bδ
1 + τ
δ
Ωj
b
= δ
bδ−1Ωj
1 + τ
for b > b.
B Equations (25) and (26)
The average serial number of technology in the economy is given by
γ =
∫ 1
0
γjdj. (52)
Given the Poisson property of the improvement of technology in jurisdictions
j ∈ [0, 1] (cf. Subsection 2.2), one obtains the following. In a small period
of time dt, the probability that R&D will lead a jump from γ to γ + 1 is
given by λz dt, while the probability that R&D will remain without success
is given by 1− λz dt. Noting (9), this defines a Poisson process χ with
dχ =
{
1 with probability λ(1− l)dt,
0 with probability 1− λ(1− l)dt, l
.
=
∫ 1
0
ljdj, (53)
where dχ is the increment of the process χ.
Because there is perfect symmetry throughout jurisdictions j ∈ [0, 1] in
the system (2), (53), (21) and (22), there is lj = l = l
P and bj = b = b
P for
j ∈ [0, 1] in equilibrium. Because there is one-to-one correspondence from
(η, s) to (lP , bP ), one can replace the subsidies (η, s) by (lP , bP ) as the central
planner’s policy instruments. Thus, the central planner maximizes (24) by
(lP , bP ) s.t. technical change (53). Noting (5), (17) and (52), one obtains the
value function of this maximization as follows:
∆(lP , bP )
.
= E
∫ ∞
T
cbδe−ρ(θ−T )dθ = f(lP , 1− bP )(bP )δE
∫ ∞
T
aγe−ρ(θ−T )dθ
=
f(lP , 1− bP )(bP )δ
ρ+ (1− a)λlP .
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Noting (8), this leads to the first-order conditions
∂ log∆
∂lP
=
fl(l
P , 1− bP )
f(lP , 1− bP ) +
(1− a)λ
ρ+ (1− a)λlP
=
1
lP
[
1− ξ
(
lP
bP
)]
+
(1− a)λ
ρ+ (1− a)λlP = 0,
∂ log∆
∂lP
=
δ
bP
− fm(l
P , 1− bP )
f(lP , 1− bP ) =
δ
bP
− 1
1− bP ξ
(
lP
bP
)
= 0.
These equations imply (25) and (26).
C The lobbying game
Following Dixit, Grossman and Helpman (1997), a subgame perfect Nash
equilibrium for this game is a policy ζ and a set of contribution schedules
R1(ζ), ..., RJ(ζ) such that the following conditions (i)− (iv) hold:
(i) Contributions Rj are non-negative but no more than the contributor’s
income, Γj ≥ 0.
(ii) The policy ζ maximizes the central planner’s welfare (27) taking the
contribution schedules Rj as given.
(iii) Jurisdiction j cannot have a viable strategy Rj(ζ) that yields it a higher
level of utility than in equilibrium, given the others’ contributions.
(iv) Jurisdiction j provides the central planner at least with the level of
utility as in the case in which it offers nothing (Rj = 0), and the cen-
tral planner responds optimally given the contribution functions of the
other jurisdictions.
19
D Equation (37)
Given η = 0, (7), (8), (13), (14), (17), (19) and (20), the central planner
budget constraint (11) becomes
τ =
∫ 1
0
(ηwjzj + srjbj)dj∫ 1
0
ckdk
=
s
∫ 1
0
rjbjdj∫ 1
0
ckdk
=
s
∫ 1
0
aγjfn(lj, nj)bjdj∫ 1
0
ckdk
=
s
∫ 1
0
aγjfn(lj, nj)bjdj∫ 1
0
aγkφ(lk, bk, s, η, τ)dk +
∫ 1
0
(gkR−Rk)b−δdk︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0
=
s
∫ 1
0
aγjfn(lj, nj)bjdj∫ 1
0
aγkφ(lk, bk, s, η, τ)dk
= s
fn(l
S, 1− bS)bS
φ(lS, bS, s, 0, τ)
= s
fn(l
S, 1− bS)bS
f(lS, 1− bS) =
sbS
1− bS ξ
(
lS
1− bS
)
.
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